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Abstract
Reluctant students often criticize the study of history as irrelevant to the present day.
In the case of one important and controversial piece of legislation, nothing could be
farther from the truth. The 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR), which places limits on
presidential power to deploy troops in combat situations, has ample application to the
political functioning of the United States today. Thus, investigating and studying the
resolution remains relevant and important today. The WPR became law in 1973,
overcoming a predictable veto by President Nixon. The legislation has consistently been
a flashpoint for political controversy – eliciting criticism by both parties, and both
opponents and supporters of expansive presidential power. Not only has it created
political controversy, but its effectiveness has been a constant source of study, debate,
and disagreement. This thesis will argue that the WPR has been largely ineffective at
achieving its goals of restricting presidential powers. It will analyze several conflicts that
the United States has been involved in since its passage. This paper will examine the
political climate at the time of its initial passage, and then examine the effect it has had
on subsequent conflicts. Ultimately, this paper will contend that the WPR has been an
ineffective attempt at restricting presidential war powers, due to its political nature, vague
language, and the modern strength of the American president.
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Repeating History
The Ineffectiveness of the 1973 War Powers Resolution
Students of history will quickly learn that what some dismiss as irrelevant to
current events has important, real implications for the present day. One pertinent example
of this is the War Powers Resolution (WPR) which was enacted in 1973 and continues to
cause political controversy and influence war-making decisions to this day. The
legislation has impacted political decision-making and wartime calculus, as well as
sparking numerous debates about its exact meaning and effectiveness. These conflicts can
only be resolved through a historical analysis of its use in different conflicts and under
different presidents. Though an investigation of the conflicts during the Ronald Reagan,
William Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations, the extent to which the WPR
achieved its goal of restraining presidential war powers can be established. Overall, it
becomes clear that the WPR has been largely ineffective at restricting presidential war
powers, evidenced by its application in several conflicts.
The concept of presidential war powers has been controversial since the creation
of the presidency. The Constitution set out a balance of war-making powers between
Congress and the president, but this balance has faced challenges since its creation.
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution gives the president the role of commander in
chief,1 while Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war and raise
armies.2 Different presidents have navigated this tension differently. The controversy

1. U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
2. Ibid., art 1, sec 8.
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“intensified after the Korean conflict,”3 under President Harry Truman, as the
introduction of forces was not precipitated by congressional approval. As Louis Fisher
argues, “President Harry Truman's commitment of U.S. troops to Korea in June 1950 still
stands as the single most important precedent for the executive use of military force
without congressional authority.”4
President Dwight Eisenhower relied on congressional approval for the military
intervention in Lebanon in 1958.5 In 1957 Congress passed the Middle East Resolution,
giving the president power to provide “economic and military aid to Middle Eastern
countries threatened by communist aggression.”6 Senator Richard B. Russell explained
the significance of this exchange by remarking that Eisenhower had successfully
navigated “the constitutional shadowland between the President’s authority to use armed
forces and the necessity for a declaration of war.”7 Eisenhower was able to engage in the
conflict in a timely manner, while Congress was able to sustain a meaningful role in the
military course the United States took. Scholars like Evan Thomas believe Eisenhower’s

3. Richard Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years
(Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004), 1.
4. Louis Fisher, “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?” The
American Journal of International Law 89, no. 1 (1995): 21
5. Stephen Brown, “The Eisenhower Model of Shared War Powers,” National
War College (1993): 1.
6. U.S. Congress, Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle
East, 85th Congress, H.J.Res. 117 (March 9, 1957).
7. Brown, “The Eisenhower Model of Shared War Powers,” 1.
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inherent disposition against conflict contributed to this unique navigation.8 Eisenhower
himself once commented that “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as
one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity.”9 Eisenhower’s personal restraint
and defense philosophy contributed to his rare ability to successfully engage in conflict
within constitutional limitations.
Eventually the conflict in Vietnam prompted Congress to assert increased
oversight surrounding presidential war-making. President John F. Kennedy used the
Truman Doctrine to justify military engagement in South Vietnam, and although there
was no Congressional declaration of war, U.S. troops, advisors, and supplies were sent to
the conflict zone.10 After Kennedy’s assassination and Lyndon Johnson becoming
president in 1963, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964, which
included language supporting “use of armed force” in the assistance of South Vietnam
against the North.11 Johnson interpreted the resolution as a green light for expanded use
of military force in Vietnam.12 The Resolution was approved quickly and with significant

8. Michael Doran, “Is Obama like Eisenhower?” Brookings Institute, last
modified October 2013, accessed March 25, 2016,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/09/obama-middle-east-eisenhowerdoran.
9. Dwight Eisenhower, “Address before the Canadian Club,” Eisenhower
Presidential Library, accessed March 25, 2016,
https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/quotes.html.
10. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Six Years, 3.
11. Ibid., 21.
12. “Congress Passes Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,” History Channel, last modified
2016, accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congresspasses-gulf-of-tonkin-resolution.
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support, but some commentators later noted that the Gulf of Tonkin incident may have
been intentionally exaggerated by the Johnson Administration to secure support for the
congressional approval.13
On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired upon the USS Maddox
and the Maddox returned the fire. Two days later, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner
Joy reported that they were under attack once again and the Turner Joy engaged the
torpedo boats in response.14 Hanoi denied the second attacks and they were later believed
to have been fabricated, but the response by the United States was swift – Johnson
authorized retaliatory air strikes almost immediately. Johnson then submitted the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution without necessarily providing all relevant information to
congressional leaders, including the possibility that the air strikes provoked further
attacks. Instead, he claimed that the North Vietnamese were engaging in “open
aggression on the high seas” and easily secured the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.15
The Resolution prompted many debates about presidential war powers that would
eventually lead to the passage of the War Powers Resolution. While the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution was used to justify continued engagement in Vietnam, Congress repealed it in
January of 1971, as public opposition to the war mounted.16 The repeal is significant to

13. Ezra Siff, Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the
Beginning of America’s Vietnam War (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1999): 37.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Scott Bomboy, “The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Limits of Presidential
Power,” National Constitution Center, last modified August 7, 2014, accessed March 25,
2016, http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/08/the-gulf-of-tonkin-and-the-limits-ofpresidential-power/.
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the progression of the war powers debate, as it demonstrated the desire of Congress and
the public to limit the president’s power to continue military engagement without
congressional approval. It also highlights some of the problems the WPR would later
encounter – after the Resolution was passed, public opinion and congressional approval
shifted, which required repeal in order to halt the president’s actions.
By August of 1968, Gallup Polls found that 53% of Americans thought that the
entire engagement in Vietnam had been a mistake, rising 29 points since the beginning of
the conflict.17 After his inauguration in 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered
clandestine bombings in Cambodia, a mission without sanction by Congress18 that caused
widespread protests when eventually reported. After news of the My Lai massacre in
Vietnam, the mounting criticism of the war by the American public reached an all-time
high.19 Amid the publishing of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, distrust of the military, the
president, and the government also increased. As troops left Vietnam in 1973, the Senate
Armed Service Committee began investigating the Cambodia bombings.20 It was in this
heated political climate that the War Powers Resolution was crafted.
Politicians and the public alike held conflicting views on the extent of presidential
war powers. When the WPR was crafted, it was motivated and grounded in
17. Mark Gillespie, “Americans Look Back at Vietnam War,” Gallup, last
modified November 16, 2000, accessed February 27, 2016,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/2299/americans-look-back-vietnam-war.aspx.
18. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., “Can Nixon keep bombing in Cambodia
without Congressional approval?” The Central Oregon Bend Bulletin, April 20, 1973, 4.
19. Truda Gray and Brian Martin, “My Lai: The Struggle over Outrage,” Peace
and Change 33, no. 1 (2008): 90.
20. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, 22.
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“incompatible principles”21 – with some legislators attempting to restrict and others
working to expand the president’s powers. Senator Thomas Eagleton illustrated that the
Senate and House “marched down separate and distinct roads, almost irreconcilable
roads.”22
One pertinent example of the way that conflicting goals resulted in confusing
legislation lies in the WPR’s conditions for committing armed forces to conflicts in the
confines of treaty obligations. As Andrew Schiff explains, “Congress removed the
presidential prerogative to deploy United States combat forces pursuant to an existing or
future mutual security treaty. Congress inserted a caveat allowing such a deployment if
implemented specifically pursuant to the requirements set forth in other sections of the
Resolution. Congress then exempted all existing treaties from the Resolution.”23 The
negotiations between the two houses resulted in a mix of requirements that were difficult
to understand or apply to specific situations. The result was unclear language and
potentially conflicting requirements that would cause confusion in the future.
Secretary of State William P. Rogers fought against passage, arguing in front of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the issue should be dealt with after “the

21. Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, “The War Powers Resolution: Time to
Say Goodbye,” Political Science Quarterly 113, no.1 (1998): 2.
22. Questions submitted to Department of State and responses thereto, March 30,
1988, in War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, p. 9799, accessed on March 20, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php.
23. Andrew Schiff, “The War Powers Resolution: From the Halls of Congress to
the Hills of Bosnia; Inertia Should Give Way to Post-Cold War Reality,” American
University International Law Review 11, no 5 (1996): 877-915.
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passions of Vietnam have passed.”24 He was pressed by Senator Frank Church, who
asked “what limits do you see to the President’s unilateral authority as commander-inchief to make war in foreign lands without congressional consent?”25 Ultimately,
supporters of congressional checks on the president’s war powers overwhelmed the
opposition by Nixon supporters or supporters of the engagement in Vietnam. Rogers
went on to write “Congress, the President, and the War Powers” in the California Law
Review in 1971, defending his position that the president held expansive war powers.26
The majority of the House thought the president should have the flexibility to
defend the United States in emergency circumstances without Congressional approval,
while most in the Senate sought stricter language to restrict the president’s ability to act
unilaterally.27 After the House modified the WPR to include a time limit, the Senate
agreed. The final bill specified that Congress had 60 days to declare war or authorize use
of force, but that within that window the president could commit and send troops. The
legislation also allowed Congress to pass a concurrent resolution at any time, to end the
engagement the president had begun. The House passed the bill 238 to 123 and the

24. Irving Bryan, “Nixon v Constitution in War Powers Debate: A Peaceful
Death,” The Washington Post, July 4, 1975, B3.
25. Ibid.
26. William Rogers, “Congress, the President, and the War Powers,” California
Law Review 59, no. 5 (September 1971):1194-1214.
27. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, 6.
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Senate passed it 75 to 20. On November 7th, 1973, the WPR became law, overriding
Nixon’s veto.28
The WPR allows the president to authorize the sending of U.S. armed forces into
combat or engagement by either “statutory authorization” by Congress or in the event of
“a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possession, or its armed forces.”29 The WPR specifies that the president is required to
notify Congress within forty-eight hours of authorizing engagement and that force may
only remain for sixty days without further authorization by Congress.30
Since its rocky beginnings, the WPR has remained controversial. Its goals were
unclear, and the extent to which it has achieved its goals has been hotly debated.
Discovering the historical effectiveness of the WPR in restricting presidential war powers
requires more than investigating its part in particular conflicts, it requires analyzing what
it did to restrain particular presidents. This approach better explains long-term foreign
policy decisions of presidents, and captures an administration’s approach to the WPR and
its possible strategies of circumvention. The three two-term presidencies analyzed are
particularly suited for this study – each experienced challenges and criticism relating to
the use of presidential war powers and their length in office provides a greater span of
time and a greater number of decisions to analyze.

28. Richard Madden, “House and Senate Override Veto: By Nixon On Curb Of
War Powers; Backers Of Bill Win 3- Year Fight,” Washington Post, November 7, 1973,
A1.
29. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C.
30. Ibid.
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Reagan faced numerous challenges relating to the use of presidential war powers.
The Reagan administration denied the constitutionality of the WPR, but still attempted to
explain its actions as consistent with it. When American peacekeeping forces were sent to
Lebanon to prevent the breakout of a civil war, he signed legislation to allow an eighteen
month extension of the Marine presence, but also made it clear he thought he should not
have to. In his diary on September 21, 1983, he wrote that while signing the law he would
“voice [his] reservations about the constitutionality of the War Powers Act.”31
Reagan came into the presidency with the explicit goal of “reassert[ing]
presidential control of foreign policy.”32 Reagan strove to craft “centralized policy
guidance and control” and shifted the role of the national security adviser to
accommodate this change in control.33 One of the first and most significant examples of
this was the use of force in Grenada. On October 25, 1983, President Reagan announced
that almost 2,000 United States soldiers and marines had begun an attack on the island.
The rationale was three-fold: to protect approximately one thousand American citizens on
the island, to “forestall further chaos,” and “to help in the restoration of democratic
institutions in Grenada.”34

31. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009):
181.
32. Richard Hooker, “Presidential Decisionmaking and Use of Force: Case Study
Grenada,” The United States Army War College Quarterly Parameters 21 (1991): 62.
33. Ibid.
34. “The Invasion of Grenada,” The Washington Post, October 26, 1983, accessed
December 10, 2015, 1.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE PRESIDENCY

13

Debate over the WPR’s applicability became relevant the second American troops
hit the ground in Grenada. Section Three of the law states that the president must “in
every possible instance” consult with Congress before committing troops to hostilities
and must continue to consult with Congress once the forces are engaged until the
operations have ceased.35 Michael Rubner argues that the invasion of Grenada was
clearly the type of situation the framers of the WPR were considering when crafting the
legislation.36 He explains that “the invading forces were engaged in fierce combat as soon
as they landed” and that “two American Marines were killed during the first ten hours of
the operation.”37 The question then becomes whether the Reagan administration notified
and consulted Congress appropriately, per the stipulations of the WPR.
Reagan’s diary records the tension the administration faced in balancing its desire
to respond to contentious situations effectively and remain within legal bounds. In the
case of the Grenada conflict, he records that “our gang38 met upstairs in the W.H. & we
told them of the Grenada operation that would take place in the next several hours. We
gave them the complete briefing.”39 It is clear the administration believed they were

35. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C.
36. Michael Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers
Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly 100, no. 4 (1986):
628.
37. Ibid., 630.
38. Reagan doesn’t specify who he is referring to, but it is likely his closes
advisors or his “Troika,” including his Chief of Staff James Baker, Deputy Chief of Staff
Michael Deaver, and Counselor to the President Ed Meese.
39. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009):
190.
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acting within the law by telling key members of Congress what would happen in the
morning. Once the situation escalated in October, Reagan noted that the potential danger
to the eight hundred Americans in medical school in Grenada meant that there was “only
one answer”40 he could give to the commanders waiting for his approval to engage.
Reagan’s memoirs also show that political concerns dictated his decision to keep
the operation secret. He argued that the “post-Vietnam syndrome” or “the resistance of
many in Congress to the use of military force abroad”41 influenced his decision. He was
concerned that if any leaders were informed too early “there would be some who would
leak it to the press”42 and jeopardize the mission.
Some records and testimony indicate that the administration did in fact comply
with the WPR, including the statements by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
during hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1983. He
claimed that “there was consultation with the leadership – bipartisan leadership of the
House and Senate.”43 Despite the typical claims of compliance by the administration, a
critical examination of the events leading up to the invasion shows the Reagan
administration’s circumvention of the requirements. The official records by the Foreign
Relations Committee indicate that the order to begin the invasion was issued at 6:00 p.m.

40. Ibid., 450.
41. Ibid., 451
42. Ibid.
43. GAO, Report B-223011, December 24, 1986, accessed February 15, 2016,
http://www.gao.gov/products/B-223011.
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on Monday, October 24.44 However, it was several hours later before a bipartisan group
of congressional leaders was secretly brought to the White House and briefed on the
military action.45 Of the leaders present, many recounted the events, noting the lack of
consultation that occurred. House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill claimed “we weren’t asked
for advice,” only that “we were informed what was taking place.”46 Senate Majority
Leader Howard H. Baker said later on the Senate floor that the group was called to the
White House to “advise us of this operation…I use the term ‘advise’ because it is true
that we were not consulted in the sense that there was no solicitation of opinion.”47
In the sense of following the restrictions set out by the WPR, as well as following
the spirit and intent of the law, the Reagan administration arguably failed. In this case,
“circumvention” required much less legal maneuvering than other instances, primarily
because the invasion was over and the majority of troops gone before formal
investigations into the conflict began.48 As Rubner describes:
since the stated intent of the resolution is to secure the collective judgment
of both Congress and the president in decisions involving the introduction
of U.S. troops into hostilities, it cannot be reasonably argued that merely
briefing a group of legislators about imminent action based on a decision

44. “Grenada War Powers: Full compliance reporting and implementation,”
Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hathi Trust Catalog Record, accessed
January 3, 2016, http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002763602.
45. Ibid.
46. “O’Neill Criticizes President; War Powers Act Is Invoked,” New York Times,
October 26, 1983, 29.
47. U.S. Congress, Senate, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October 1983, Congressional
Record 129:14912.
48. Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323. D.C. 1984.
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that had already been finalized qualifies as applying the judgment of
Congress to such decision.49
This particular case of the WPR’s applicability and lack of compliance is
important because it began to reveal a fundamental flaw with the law: vague language.
The phrase “in every possible instance” allows room for argument that there are some
instances in which consultation is simply not possible. In defense of instances like the
Grenada invasion, scholars John W. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner have argued that
geographic limitations, such as inability to reach key legislators and communicate with
them, may create situations in which prior consultation is impossible.50
The ambiguity of the language resulted in conflicting interpretations of the correct
action in the case of the Grenada invasion. Because Reagan believed that consultation
would endanger the mission, it arguably constituted an instance in which consultation
was not possible. However, the congressmen that were told of the invasion clearly felt
that their input or oversight should have been solicited. The subjectivity of determining
when consultation is possible or impossible makes the enforceability of the WPR
incredibly difficult.
Another case that characterized the Reagan administration’s approach to
presidential war powers and the WPR was the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Border
disputes and fears that the Iranian Revolution would inspire instability in other Arab

49. “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the
Invasion of Grenada,” 632.
50. John Spanier and Eric Uslaner, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemmas
(Austin, TX: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982): 69.
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nations had caused a full-blown war between Iran and Iraq in 1980.51 In early 1984, Iraq
began attacking Iranian shipping in an attempt to provoke a sufficient Iranian response to
ensure U.S. involvement, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz.52 The Reagan
administration had promised to intervene if the Strait was closed and this potential for
U.S. intervention brought to light another vague term integral to the implementation of
the WPR – “imminent hostilities.”
On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile on the USS Stark, killing thirtyseven U.S. sailors.53 This incident made clear the ongoing debate concerning the
possibility of hostilities in the region. Throughout 1987, the United States increased its
forces in the gulf, including providing naval escorts for Kuwaiti oil tankers.54 By the time
the WPR became a relevant political issue, naval forces in the region had increased to 11
major warships; the USS Bridgeton and United States-chartered Texaco-Caribbean had
struck mines; and a United States F-14 fighter plane had fired missiles at a potentially
threatening Iranian aircraft.55
Though each of these events clearly raised concerns, the question remained if they
constituted “imminent hostilities” and should have been reported to Congress under
Section 4 of the WPR. Amid increasing congressional concern, Reagan began submitting

51. Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: 1980-1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing:
2002), 7.
52. Ibid., 50.
53. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, 16.
54. Ibid., 17.
55. Ibid.
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reports the administration claimed were consistent with the WPR.56 While the Reagan
administration began submitting reports, it denied that the previous events had constituted
“hostilities” or “imminent hostilities,” as the United States’ action had been exclusively
defensive.57 While “imminent danger” pay had been announced for military personnel in
the region on August 27, 1987, the administration maintained that this did not trigger
Section 4 of the WPR and start the timeline of Congressional approval.58 This tension
was not lost on the public or the legislature. The Los Angeles Times reported in 1987 that
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan commented upon the announcement that ‘the
Administration can’t have it both ways…. I don’t see how the Administration can avoid
invoking the War Powers Act”59 once the bonus had been authorized.
The political battle over Reagan’s use of force in the Persian Gulf would prove to
highlight not only the issue of vague language, but the issue of the political climate
necessary to enforce the legislation. In this case, both houses of Congress attempted, in
multiple ways, to intervene. A primary problem for those that wished to reclaim
Congress’s role in war-making was the widely differing approaches by legislators.60 The
Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment to the Defense authorization bill to apply the
WPR to the conflict and require consultation from the president; and the Senate passed a

56. Ibid., 18.
57. Ibid.
58. John Broder, “Pentagon Oks Danger Pay for Gulf Duty,” Los Angeles Times,
August 27, 1987, 1.
59. Ibid.
60. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, 17.
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measure that called for a report by the President within thirty days and expedited
procedures for a joint resolution, but the House dropped it.61 H.J. Res 387 exemplified the
problems with enforcement – it sanctioned continued presence, but was nevertheless an
attempt at asserting congressional control. This would remain an important difficulty of
enforcement – how to support a military engagement without supporting the executive
overreach that authorized it.
Some attempts focused on forcing the president to report U.S. actions, others
attempted to cut off his funding for any engagement in the conflict, and others sought to
officially sanction the use of force. There was no consensus on the kind of action that
Congress wanted taken, and so there was little political will to either stop or sanction
what the president was doing. Additionally, the House and the Senate generally took
different routes towards oversight – the House focused on enforcing the WPR, while the
Senate sought to carve out a Congressional role in the conflict without invoking it.62
Not only were the legislative attempts troubled, but the attempt by some
legislators to use the courts to enforce the law also failed. In August 1987, over one
hundred members of Congress filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, requesting that the court declare that the administration file a report under
section 4 of the WPR.63 In December, the court dismissed the case, under the political
question doctrine, arguing that the dispute was one that the congressmen had “primarily

61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 19.
63. Ibid.
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with fellow legislators.”64 This response by the court typified the rest of these interactions
– the courts often ruled on the political question doctrine, or argued that if the legislators
were concerned, they should have enacted legislation halting the conflict in question. In
yet another way, Reagan’s presidency crystalized some of the central problems with the
enforceability of the WPR – not only did vague language hinder it, but political climates
would dictate if it was enforced, and the courts would consistently avoid dealing with it.
Another issue with the WPR that the Reagan administration exposed was the
effect the legislation potentially had on adversaries of the United States. When the United
States was engaged in Lebanon under President Reagan, Special Envoy to the Middle
East Donald Rumsfeld noted that a “Jordanian official told me the Syrians had analyzed
America’s War Powers Resolution carefully. They knew that congressional support for
our involvement in Beirut was fragile and vulnerable to the slightest shift of activity in
the region.”65 During a contentious point of international relations, the difficulty that the
WPR had to actually restrain presidential powers was clear, but it still had the
diplomatically ill effect of letting opponents believe they had an advantage. This would
later become the exact reason Reagan gave for not entirely fulfilling the consultation
requirements of the WPR in the case of Grenada – he didn’t want to risk the information
leaking and harming the mission.66 Clearly this concern would continue influencing
presidents’ decisions to evade or follow the WPR’s constraints.

64. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
65. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (Westminster: Penguin, 2011):24.
New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009): 190.
66. Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 451.
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The presidency of William Clinton would continue to raise issues concerning the
implementation of the WPR. His use of military force would raise questions about how
long congressional authorization lasts and whether commitments to operations
spearheaded by the U.N. required additional congressional approval or consultation.
After Operation Desert Storm ended in 1991, U.S. military forces continued
involvement in the region to deal with continuing conflicts or emergency situations in
Iraq. Throughout the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, these activities
brought into question exactly how long a congressional authorization for force lasts.
During the immediate aftermath of the operation, President Bush used military force
multiple times in support of UN Security Council resolutions condemning actions by the
Iraqi government. Bush reported the military actions to Congress, but there was no
official consultation or congressional action.67 Upon the start of President Clinton’s first
term, he announced that his administration would “adhere to the policy toward Iraq set by
the Bush administration.”68 On multiple dates during 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in
Iraq, suspected of violating U.N. resolutions. Clinton also reported to Congress on June
28, 1993, that on June 26, naval forces had launched an attack on Iraqi Intelligence
Service command and control complex in Baghdad.69
These events raised an important question about the stipulations of the WPR.
While there had been an Authorization for the Use of Force (a joint resolution granting

67. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, 24.
68. Ibid., 25.
69. William Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi
Intelligence Headquarters,” United States Government Publishing Office, June 28, 1993,
1.
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congressional authorization for military engagement) issued in January 1991 for the use
of force in Iraq, it was uncertain if that same resolution covered the U.S. following the
U.N. Security Council cease-fire.70 It had authorized the president to use force “pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of previous Security
Council Resolutions relating to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.”71 However, the conclusion by
Congress was that further authorization was not required if the use of force was intended
to enforce the cease-fire resolution later adopted by the Security Council.72
During 1993, 1996, and 1998, Clinton authorized strikes against Iraq at numerous
times and for various reasons. The United States completed at least 130 strikes due to
violations of the no-fly zone and many were in response to “Saddam Hussein’s military
actions against Kurdish resistance groups in the north.”73 However, there was very little
consultation with Congress during these military engagements. Ryan Hendrickson
explains that while Clinton attempted to communicate prior to the strikes with
Congressman Ron Dellums, he failed to reach him and no other evidence of attempts to
contact congressional leaders exists.74 According to Hendrickson, no members of
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Congress were involved in the discussions of Iraqi complicity in the strikes.75 However,
little backlash to the lack of communication ensued, as there existed a high level of
political support for the strikes.76
Not only does this example during Clinton’s presidency provide insight into the
complexities of combining congressional approval for specific actions with compliance
with U.N. Security Council resolutions, it once again highlights the problem of shifting
political will. The WPR’s intent was to ensure that Congress maintained greater oversight
over presidential war powers, but this has been an issue historically only when the use of
force becomes politically unpopular. These actions following Operation Desert Storm
were not, and so there was much less congressional opposition than in other conflicts.
Another issue interpreting the WPR occurred during Clinton’s presidency – the
issue of whether treaties or international organizations were precluded from the dictates
of the law. Actions in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia took place within a NATO
framework, raising the question of whether action under this framework (or for that
matter, within any treaty-based organization) was subject to WPR requirements. Article
11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that actions under the framework should be carried
out by the states “in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,”77
implying that Congress has a role to play and the WPR should apply to some extent.

75. Ibid., 6.
76. Ibid., 7.
77. The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4 1989, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Article 11.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE PRESIDENCY

24

Additionally, Section 8 of the WPR states that war-making authority should not be
inferred from treaties unless specific legislation is enacted.78
This framework would soon be tested. On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 770, authorizing for “all measures necessary” to deliver
humanitarian assistance to Bosnia. On August 11, 1992, the Senate approved the
administration advocating for such a resolution, but specified that no military personnel
should be engaged in hostilities “without clearly defined objectives.”79 On that same day,
the House passed legislation urging for the same measures, but included the use of force.
On February 10, 1993, the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, announced that
diplomatic solutions were being encouraged and if they were successful, United States
forces would help enforce them.80 Over the course of 1993, the United States
“participated in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions, and aerial
enforcement of a ‘no-fly zone.’”81 On March 31, the Security Council instructed member
states to “take all necessary measures” to enforce the “no-fly zone.”82
As the conflict dragged on, the situation only became more complicated and
congressional and public opinion more divided.83 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Colin Powell thought that the “no-fly zone” was an overreach of executive power and the
public was largely confused by U.S. intervention at all.84 Representative Richard Durbin
described the problem by saying “This is why you really have to have a decision made in
advance. There is usually a strong bipartisan sentiment to provide military and moral
support to the troops.”85 While some in Congress may have disapproved of expansive
executive powers, those that also supported this particular intervention declined to
support enforcing the WPR. The alternative was also true – Senator Bob Doyle of Kansas
“reluctantly” supported the president’s move, saying that regardless of if the Congress
approved of the particular action, “the president has the authority under the Constitution
to do so.”86
The lack of any significant consensus on the issue effectively killed Congress’s
ability to intervene and enforce the WPR. This highlighted another problem with
enforcing the WPR: what happens when Congress cannot reach a clear consensus?
Congress did more than face indecision in the matter of the military engagement; there
was little consensus on what Congress should do to reign in the president. As Adler
notes, “a Congress unwilling to exercise its constitutional authority in making decisions
on war and peace” could not be expected to either enforce the constraints on Clinton’s
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action or enact punishment for them.87 This second important military engagement of
Clinton’s presidency highlights an important problem with the enforceability of the WPR
– it relies upon not only the willingness of Congress, but on the coherency of Congress’
opinion on the conflict. When Congress is fractured and the perspectives are varied,
enforcing the WPR becomes impossible.
In George W. Bush’s presidency, the struggle to apply and enforce the WPR
continued. While Bush faced many of the same conflicts as Clinton, a different set of
conflicts raised more important questions for the WPR. As the nature of war evolved, the
types of decisions and the timetables for making them have changed for commanders in
chief. The conflicts that characterized Bush’s presidency were often fought with
advanced technology by smaller units and with quicker timeframes than traditional land
armies or navies.88 Additionally, these conflicts had often indistinguishable opponents,
vague goals, and poorly defined tactics.89 Donald Rumsfeld, the president’s Secretary of
Defense, said of the WPR that “despite its questionable and still untested
constitutionality, [it] undercut the President’s ability to convince troublemakers of
America’s staying power”90 in conflict.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush “characterized these attacks
as more than acts of terror” and instead claimed they were “acts of war” and that
87. David Gray Adler, “The Law: The Clinton Theory of the War Power,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2004): 160.
88. Judah A. Druck, “Droning on: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing
Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” Cornell Law Review 98, no. 1 (2012): 212.
89. John Yoo, Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism,
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“freedom and democracy [were] under attack.”91 This new approach, later coined “the
war on terror” would require an entirely new framework for evaluation. The “war” was
unconventional in every sense – not only did it consist of largely clandestine operations,
intelligence gathering, and smaller military engagements, it also was fought against an
unconventional opponent. After the attacks, Bush consulted Congress about the response
the United States should have. As a result of those discussions, a joint resolution passed
both houses, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists” (AUMF).92
The legislation passed 420 to 1 in the House and 98 to 0 in the Senate.93 The legislation
was overwhelmingly popular in the wake of the devastation over the attacks. The
legislation authorized the president to use “all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons.”94 The joint resolution went so far as to explicitly declare that
its intent was to “constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution,” but that “Nothing in this resolution supercedes any
requirement of the War Powers Resolution.”95
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This decisive move by Congress seems to be a stunning example of the WPR at
work – Congress was consulted, and then used legislation to give authority to the
president to engage militarily. However, this was just the beginning of the conflict. As
Bush’s actions in the “war on terror” increased and public and political approval of the
actions decreased, questions of WPR compliance became clear. Even prior to the
AUMF’s enactment, some in Congress were concerned that the president would view the
legislation as an invitation to ignore the reporting requirements of the WPR.96 One of the
primary reasons for this concern was how radically this new “war” departed from
conventional war-fighting. Senator Russ Feingold, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on the Constitution, explained that the “war on terror” is a war against “a loose network
of terrorists,” instead of the traditional “state with clearly defined borders.”97 This makes
the questions of what the president has been authorized to do very difficult to answer,
since the amorphous terrorist group can span different borders, people groups, and
tactics.
Although Congress had authorized the president to fight against those that
contributed to the September 11 attacks, the war slowly broadened to include terrorism as
a concept, something characterized by a “highly mobile, diffuse enemy that operates
largely beyond the reach of our conventional war-fighting techniques.”98 Not only does
this make defining what the president has been authorized to do difficult, it complicates
the traditional means of congressional involvement. As Feingold continued, “there can be
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no peace treaty with such an enemy,” and “likewise, there can be no formal, public
declaration of war.”99
As President Bush noted in his memoirs, his presidency was important for
creating and introducing legal concepts and political mechanisms for addressing this
unique threat. He argues that “we were in the early years of a long struggle. We had
created a variety of tools to deal with the threats” and Bush contended to “turn those tools
into institutions and laws that would be available” in the future.100
Additionally, the fact that the AUMF authorized the president to wage war against
“organizations” raises questions about how the WPR interacts with this congressional
authorization. As Bradley and Goldsmith describe, “the contours of an ‘organization’ are
much less settled than the contours of a ‘nation’ or a ‘person.’”101 This ambiguity of
congressional authorization matters – if the president takes action against those loosely
aligned with the groups the AUMF intended to target, does that require another
authorization or does it start the timeline for withdrawal? These questions went largely
unanswered by the Bush administration and congressional leaders. Instead, the questions
highlighted the inherent and unresolvable nature of the ambiguities in the WPR and its
ineffectiveness.
Only a year after the AUMF, concerns and scholarship increased that questioned
the WPR’s ability to adequately ensure cooperation between the branches. Council on
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Foreign Relations fellow Alton Frye, in a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on the Constitution, explained that “continuing consultation” was not only
necessary for an effective “campaign against terrorism,” but could not “be mandated; it
must flow from mutual sensitivity between leaders.”102 He argued that to keep the spirit
of the WPR would require diligence the law simply could not force, but that “incentives
for such consultation” could “certainly be enhanced.”103 While full compliance was not
legislatively possible, it would require the attention of congressional leaders to ensure as
much consultation as possible. Without “firm assertion of congressional prerogatives,”104
the executive would not have any incentive to follow the requirements set by the WPR.
This highlights another problem– not only do political conditions alter the chances the
WPR is enforced by Congress, but its goals are inherently impossible to artificially
produce by law.
This argument, that the consultative mechanism must be strengthened, continues
today. In 2014, Senators Tim Kaine and John McCain introduced the War Powers
Consultation Act, which would strengthen the consultative process between the president
and Congress.105 The Senators began reviewing ways to reform the system in July 2013,
describing the WPR as “ineffective at establishing a consultative process…over our
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nation’s most important decision – whether or not to send our men and women in
uniform into harm’s way.”106 This reform attempt was prompted by Kaine and McCain’s
concern over President Barack Obama’s use of force in Syria in August 2013.107
When the bill was introduced on the Senate floor, McCain explained that “the
Constitution gives the power to declare war to the Congress, but Congress has not
formally declared war since June 1942, even though our nation has been involved in
dozens of military actions of one scale or another since that time.”108 The War Powers
Consultation Act would create a “permanent consultation committee” of congressional
leaders and the military conflict-related committees, Intelligence, Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, and Appropriations.109 While the legislation has not been passed, its
introduction and bipartisan nature110 show that Congress is interested in curtailing the
perceived overreach of presidential war power.
A second but related WPR issue encountered by the Bush administration was its
use of drone warfare. New technology has always impacted the way leaders wage war – it
alters their tactics, adjusts their mindsets, and sometimes, lowers the cost of risky
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maneuvers.111 In the case of drone warfare, new technology fundamentally changed the
concerns presidents entertained when considering potentially illegal action. Druck argues
that “by ameliorating many of the concerns often associated with large-scale wars,
technology-driven warfare has effectively removed the public’s social and political
limitations that previously discouraged a President from using potentially illegal military
force.”112 The use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles has increased as technology has
allowed for greater capabilities and stealth. As Druck argues, this increase has caused
fundamental changes in thinking about presidential war powers, because the
repercussions of military engagement have decreased.113
As the “war on terror” has progressed, the rapidly changing face of warfare and
the technology used to wage it has not been met with equally evolving legislation. Laney
contends that “decision making regarding the deployment of drones is concentrated in the
hands of an alarmingly small number of individuals” in a fashion that is “removed from
democratic processes.”114 He argues that “the evolution of drones…has occurred without
the accompanying legislative infrastructure.”115 The drone warfare that began during
Bush’s presidency is a powerful example of how the WPR’s ineffectiveness has only
grown over time. As technology and the way presidents have used it has changed, the
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WPR’s assumption of traditional “boots on the ground” engagement has proved less
applicable. The consequences of engaging autonomous technology are significantly less
than sending troops, in terms of both lives lost and public approval ratings. As these
changes occurred and the applicability of the WPR decreased, its ineffectiveness to
restrain presidential power increased.
Ultimately, the WPR has been ineffective at limiting the scope of presidential war
powers. It faces problems of implementation, application, and enforceability. Its
enforceability is hindered by the shifting tides of political climates. Its language is vague,
even in traditional conflicts, and this problem was magnified when modern conflicts
began to alter the way wars are fought. These issues have clearly influenced three modern
two-term presidencies. An analysis of the administrations of Ronald Reagan, William
Clinton, and George W. Bush, illuminates the problems with the WPR. Analyzing three
different presidencies allows for more comprehensive analysis. The WPR is not just
ineffective because a particular administration was skilled at circumvention, each
administration proved the law’s inability to restrain power.
Recent attempts to reform the WPR prove that legislatures, scholars, and the
public are concerned with the law’s ability to produce genuine consultation between the
executive and the legislative branches. As conflicts continue to evolve farther from
traditional means of warfare, the importance of evaluating the WPR’s ability to restrain
abusive executive power cannot be overstated.
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